The End of Innocence: The Effect of California\u27s Recreational Use Statue on Children at Play by Horning, Kathryn D.
San Diego Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 3 Article 6
8-1-1995
The End of Innocence: The Effect of California's
Recreational Use Statue on Children at Play
Kathryn D. Horning
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San Diego
Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathryn D. Horning, The End of Innocence: The Effect of California's Recreational Use Statue on Children at Play, 32 San Diego L. Rev.
857 (1995).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol32/iss3/6
The End of Innocence: The Effect of 
California's Recreational Use Statute on 
Children at Play* 
One hundred years ago, the idea that children deserved special 
protection from dangerous conditions found on private property was 
adopted by both the United States and California Supreme Courts. 
Due to the innocence of children and their inability to perceive 
possible dangers, landowners were required to provide a higher 
degree of protection to children than to adults. This new and 
revolutionary idea, later to be labeled the attractive nuisance 
doctrine, was adopted by the Restatement of Torts in what has been 
called its "most effective single section. "1 However, today in 
California, a recent decision has reversed a century of development 
in the law which had provided protection to children. The duty of 
care required of a landowner towards the children of this state has 
returned to that which existed over one hundred years ago. 
INTRODUCTION 
The State of California is blessed with an abundance of scenic 
treasures. Its natural landscape contains over 1,100 miles of Pacific shoreline, 
massive mountains, magnificent lakes and sweeping deserts. Such diversity 
and contrast lend to its appeal as a place where recreational pursuits may 
flourish, at times on realty owned by others. 2 
The opening words of Ornelas v. Randolph demonstrate the California 
Legislature's intent behind the state's recreational use statute, California 
Civil Code section 846, which reduces the duty of care that landowners 
* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Edmund Ursin for his 
invaluable insight and critique of this Comment. 
I. William L. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CAL. L. REV. 427, 435 (1959). 
2. Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1098, 847 P.2d 560, 561, 17 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 594, 595 (1993) (en bane). 
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owe to those using the land for recreational purposes.3 Since its 
enactment in 1963, this statute has been subject to numerous interpreta-
tions by the appellate courts in their attempts to apply a law based on 
the term "recreation," a term so vague and subject to individual 
interpretation that a suitable legal definition for it may be impossible. 
The legislative history ( or lack thereof) that accompanies the statute has 
provided little direction to the courts in deciding cases before them. As 
the Ninth Circuit recently noted, "[ u ]nfortunately the Legislature has 
been silent about its underlying intent in enacting section Civil Code 
846."4 The appellate courts have generally been guided by attempting 
to balance the need for increased recreational area with the concern of 
landowners regarding liability to entrants who use private land for 
recreation. In the past, the courts based their decisions on whether 
immunizing a landowner from the general duty of care owed to entrants 
would support the presumed legislative intent of encouraging landowners 
to open their private lands for recreational use. 5 
The Ornelas decision appears to depart from this approach, which had 
been followed for thirty years. In Ornelas, the court determined that a 
landowner owed no duty of care to a trespassing child who entered 
private property, presumably to play on old farm machinery stored by 
the owner. 6 In discussing the "recreational opportunities offered by the 
property," the court employed an extremely broad interpretation of the 
recreational use statute and applied its benefit, an immunization from the 
duty of care, to private property that was neither suitable nor desirable 
for recreational purposes. 7 This interpretation by the Ornelas court may 
have been influenced by a growing trend towards limiting the liability 
of landowners, possibly indicating a dissatisfaction with the inclusion of 
trespassers in the group towards whom one owes a duty of care. 
However, the Ornelas decision singles out the group of individuals least 
able to take responsibility for the decision to trespass and least able to 
protect themselves---children. One hundred years of progress in the duty 
3. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 846 (West 1982). 
4. Mansion v. United States, 945 F.2d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 1991) ( quoting Nelsen 
v. City of Gridley, 113 Cal. App. 3d 87, 91, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757,759 (1980)). 
5. E.g., id. at 1117; Parish v. Lloyd, 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 788, 147 Cal. Rptr. 
431, 432 (1978). 
6. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1098, 847 P.2d at 561, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. The 
defendant, Randolph, owned a large piece of property. On one open part he stored old 
farm equipment, machinery, and irrigation pipes. The plaintiff, eight-year-old Jose 
Ornelas, lived adjacent to the Randolph property in a residential subdivision. Ornelas 
and five other children entered the property uninvited and began playing on the old 
machinery. Although Ornelas was actually just sitting and watching the others play, a 
piece of pipe dislodged and fell on him. Id. 
7. Id. at 1102, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598. 
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of care society owes to its children may have been reversed by the 
application of the recreational use statute to children who trespass in 
order to play on private property. 
This Comment will consider the history and purpose of California's 
recreational use statute and the interpretations and revisions of the statute 
prior to Ornelas. The separate policy of protecting young children will 
also be discussed, considering how California advanced this policy with 
the adoption of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine - the Restatement of 
Torts position on the standard of care owed to trespassing children. 
Next, this Comment will discuss how the recreational use statute may 
now play a role in limiting a general duty of care owed to trespassing 
children by creating a special class of citizens to whom no duty is owed, 
conflicting with the long-standing policy of increased care toward 
children. Finally, this Comment will conclude by making recommenda-
tions on the steps that the California Legislature and/or courts should 
take in order to provide California's children with the protection they 
received prior to Ornelas. 
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RECREATIONAL USE 
STATUTE AND LANDOWNER LIABILITY 
Americans value the tremendous variety and opportunity for recre-
ational activities this country provides. In 1962, the Outdoor Recreation 
Resources Review Commission released a report with proposals designed 
to "satisfy our outdoors needs into the next century," however, a 1987 
follow-up report found that "by the late 1970s, participation in some 
activities had surpassed the rates [the Outdoor Recreation Resources 
Review Commission] projected for the year 2000."8 As anyone who 
has recently been to any of our more popular national parks knows, the 
strain on a limited number of facilities has become enormous. Reserva-
tion requirements, long lines, and large crowds have become the norm. 
An awareness of the need for additional recreational areas has turned 
attention to privately owned lands that could serve this demand.9 
8. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON AMERICANS OUTDOORS, AMERICANS OUTDOORS: 
THE LEGACY, THE CHALLENGE 15 (1987). 
9. Id. at 19. The report recognizes that the competition for available land suitable 
for recreational use is increasing due to more people doing many different things. The 
private sector could help ease this burden, however, barriers to investment due to a 
"liability crisis" prevent landowners from increasing public access. Id. The commission 
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However, private owners have been wary of potential liability for 
entrants injured when using their property and have been unwilling to 
open their land for public use. Recreational use statutes were developed 
to ease this burden. 
Michigan enacted the country's first recreational use statute in 
1953 .10 Less than one-third of the states had enacted similar legislation 
by 1965, when the Council of State Governments proposed a model act 
for public recreation on private lands. 11 However, by 1989, at least 
forty-nine states had enacted recreational use statutes. 12 Many of the 
statutes are patterned after the model act, but there are wide variations 
among the statutes, especially among those that predate the model act. 13 
Aside from the individual differences, however, the basic effect is the 
same. As stated in the suggested legislation, such statutes are "designed 
to encourage availability of private lands by limiting the liability of 
owners." Further, "where private owners are willing to make their land 
available to members of the general public without charge . . . every 
reasonable encouragement should be given to them."14 
Section 846 of the California Civil Code was enacted in 1963, two 
years before the suggested legislation was proposed. The Act limited the 
liability of property owners toward persons entering their land for certain 
recreational purposes.15 The legislature did not include a statement of 
recommended increasing incentives to private landowners in order to increase public 
access and use for recreational purposes. Id. 
10. Act of June 10, 1953, 1953 Mich. Pub. Acts 201 (codified at MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 300.201 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995)). 
11. 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 150 (Council of State Gov'ts 1965). 
12. N. Linda Goldstein et al., Recreational Use Statutes--Time for Reform, PROB. 
& PROP., July-Aug. 1989, at 6, 7. 
13. Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner's Liability 
for Personal Injury to Recreational User, 47 A.L.R.4TH 262, 271 (1986). 
14. SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 11, at 150. The model act also 
suggests that the title conform to state requirements, such as: "An act to encourage 
landowners to make land and water areas available to the public by limiting liability in
connection therewith." Id. Section 1 of the act specifies the purpose, and states: "The 
purpose of this act is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas 
available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons 
entering thereon for such purposes." Id. The California act contains no such statement 
of purpose. 
15. Act of July 17, 1963, ch. 1759, 1963 Cal. Stat. 3511 (codified as amended at 
CAL. CIV. CODE§ 846 (West 1982)). 
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purpose or further clarify the intent through legislative history. 16 The 
statute, when enacted in 1963, read in full as follows: 
An owner of any estate in real property owes no duty of care to keep the 
premises safe for entry or use by others for taking of fish and game, camping, 
water sports, hiking or sightseeing, or to give any warning of hazardous 
conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to persons entering 
for such purposes, except as provided in this section. 
An owner of any estate in real property who gives pennission to another to 
take fish and game, camp, hike or sightsee upon the premises does not thereby 
(a) extend any assurance that the premises are safe for such purpose, or (b) 
constitute the person to whom pennission has been granted the legal status of 
an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, or (c) assume responsi-
bility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by any 
act of such person to whom pennission has been granted except as provided in 
this section. 
This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful 
or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, 
structure or activity; or (b) for injury suffered in any case where pennission to 
take fish and game, camp, hike or sightsee was granted for a consideration other 
than the consideration, if any, paid to said landowner by the State; or ( c) to any 
persons who are expressly invited rather than merely pennitted to come upon 
the premises by the landowner. 
Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury 
to person or property. 17 
As demonstrated by the wording of the statute, the original form of the 
act was very specific as to the activities that would constitute recreation-
al use. The activities listed were limited to those activities for which 
state and national parks are normally used. It appears that the implicit 
purpose of the statute was to ease the burden on public recreational areas 
by easing the fear of liability for private landowners who allow such 
activities on their land.18 Private land that can be used for such 
recreational activities can provide additional space for people who would 
otherwise be using the limited number of public parks available. By 
16. Id.; see also 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 647 (1963); Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 
1095, 1105-06 n.8, 847 P.2d 560, 564 n.8, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 601 n.8 (1993) (en 
bane) (legislative history inconclusive); Nelsen v. City of Gridley, 113 Cal. App. 3d 87, 
91, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 (1980) (legislature silent about underlying intent); Donaldson 
v. United States, 653 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1981) (history provides insufficient insight 
as to intent of legislature). 
17. Act of July 17, 1963, ch. 1759, 1963 Cal. Stat. 3511 (codified as amended at 
CAL. CIV. CODE§ 846 (West 1982)). 
18. See, e.g., Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 
3d 699, 707-08, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (1983); Parish v. Lloyd, 
82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1978). 
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reducing the duty of care that a landowner might normally owe, the 
legislature is encouraging private owners to allow specific recreational 
activities on their land. 19 
At the time California's recreational use statute was enacted, the duty 
of care required of a landowner was based on the traditional common 
law classification of the entrant. Prior to 1968 and California's 
landmark decision of Rowland v. Christian,20 the legal duty of a 
landowner was based on the status of the entrant--either an invitee, 
licensee, or trespasser.21 
An invitee was owed a full duty of care. When a visitor entered an 
owner's property upon invitation and for business concerning the owner, 
the owner had an affirmative duty to protect the visitor from known 
dangers and to use reasonable care to discover unknown dangers.22 In 
other words, the owner had a duty to make the premises safe in 
exchange for the pecuniary benefit he expected to receive. An invitation 
to enter private land for the owner's benefit justified the entrant's 
expectation that the property would be safe. When no benefit was 
expected, the entrarit did not qualify as an invitee, and a full duty of care 
was not owed. An additional definition of invitee was adopted by the 
Second Restatement of Torts in section 332.23 An invitee would also 
include a person invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the 
public for purposes for which the land was held open to the public.24 
In such cases, an implied representation was made to the public that 
because the land was held open to them, it had been prepared for their 
safe entry.25 
A licensee was a visitor entering by consent or permission.26 In 
contrast to an invitee, a licensee came onto the premises for her own 
purpose or benefit, rather than for the landowner's benefit. A social 
guest fell into this classification, as did those who entered with 
permission for purposes unrelated to the owner's benefit, such as for 
recreational use, use as a shortcut, and use by sales persons and 
solicitors.27 Permission could be express or could be implied by the 
19. See, e.g., Delta Farms, 33 Cal. 3d at 708, 660 P.2d at 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 
499. 
20. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). See infra note 42 for 
a discussion of facts. 
21. E.g., 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW§ 894 (9th ed. 1988). 
22. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 61, 
at 419 (5th ed. 1984). 
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). 
24. Id. 
25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 422. 
26. WITKIN, supra note 21, § 909. 
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 413. 
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owner's conduct, or even the condition of the land.28 Permission did 
not, however, elevate the status of the entrant to an invitee. Encourage-
ment to enter without added assurance, implied or express, that the 
premises were safe for the visit did not make the owner fully liable for 
the condition of the land. The limited duty owed to the licensee was a 
duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring the licensee, to refrain 
from conducting dangerous activities where the presence of the licensee 
was or should reasonably have been known, and to warn of dangerous 
conditions known by the landowner when there was reason to believe the 
licensee would not discover the condition by herself.29 In all other 
situations, a licensee assumed the risk of the condition of the premises 
and had no right to demand that the premises be safe. In the case of the 
social guest, the theory was that the guest was placed on the same 
footing as the family and was expected to use the property as the owner 
did, with no special inspection or preparation for the guest's safety.30 
The final category was that of the trespasser. In general, the 
landowner owed no duty of care to unknown, uninvited entrants.31 A 
landowner had a duty to refrain from intentionally harming the 
trespasser, but was under no duty to keep the premises safe. This 
exemption from general liability developed historically from a policy to 
allow unrestrained use of private land.32 A wide variety of privileges 
accompanied land ownership due to the importance of land throughout 
the development of law in England and America and due to the 
dominance of the English landowning classes in the social and political 
development of society and the common law.33 The landowner was 
given legally protected, exclusive possession, including the right to 
consent to entrants on the owner's terms. Where there was no right or 
28. Id. 
29. WITKIN, supra note 21, § 909. 
30. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 414. 
31. WITKIN, supra note 21, § 905. Two classes of trespassers are distinguished. 
A landowner must only refrain from intentional harms and willful, wanton injury to an 
unknown trespasser. Once a trespasser becomes known, however, the landowner has a 
duty to warn of artificial conditions that are concealed dangers and to use reasonable 
care in hazardous activities.  
32. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 57; Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern 
Status of Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability Upon Status of Injured Party as 
Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser; 22 A.L.R.4TH 294, 299 (1983). 
33. Gulbis, supra note 32, at 299. 
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permission to enter, entrants were expected to look out for them-
selves.34 
An exception to the no-duty rule for trespassers developed, however, 
in the special case of child trespassers. An adult trespasser was expected 
to understand the possible dangers and assume the risk of uninvited 
entry. However, young children were thought to be incapable of 
perceiving potential danger or making intelligent decisions regarding 
trespass.35 Society's strong interest in the protection of children 
overshadowed the landowner's interest in the unrestricted freedom to use 
his or her land, especially when the landowner might have been the only 
one available to protect children from a danger existing on the proper-
ty. 36 The Restatement of Torts adopted a special rule for child trespass-
ers with the attractive nuisance doctrine, which bases liability on the 
foreseeability of harm to trespassing children and is actually simple 
negligence law. 37 This section has been called the Restatement 's "most 
34. Id. at 294. 
35. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 59, at 399; Prosser, supra note l, at 429. 
36.· KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 59, at 399. 
37. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 339 (1934); Prosser, supra note l, at 432. The rule 
for trespassing children was stated in the Restatement as follows: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children 
trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he 
maintains upon the land, if · 
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the 
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, 
and 
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know 
and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk 
of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and 
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or 
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the 
area made dangerous by it, and 
( d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as 
compared to the risk to young children involved therein. 
RESTATEMENT, supra. 
The term "attractive nuisance" is actually a misnomer. The term came about as the 
courts attempted to justify a special rule for trespassing children in terms of negligence 
even though a landowner ordinarily would have owed no duty of care toward a 
trespasser. Prosser, supra note ·1, at 431. The idea was that if a dangerous condition 
attracted the child onto the land, the landowner could not claim immunity based on the 
trespass. Id. Due to this interpretation, the early cases applying the doctrine predicated 
liability on a finding that the child was lured or enticed onto the land. E.g., United Zinc 
& Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922). The necessity of allurement was later 
discarded by the majority of courts, although the name "attractive nuisance" remained 
and is still commonly used. Prosser, supra note l, at 448; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 332 cmt. b (1965). California courts continue to refer to the "attractive 
nuisance doctrine" even though attractive and nuisance are not requirements of the rule. 
See, e.g., King v. Lennen, 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1959); 
Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48 (1958); Smith v. Americania Motor 
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effective single section"38 due to its adoption by a majority of courts. 
California has recognized the special duty of care owed to child 
trespassers since 1891, when the California Supreme Court decided 
Barrett v. Southern Pacific Co. 39 . 
In 1968, California became the first state to reject the common law 
entrant status classifications,40 although Great Britain had imposed a 
general duty of care toward all entrants except trespassers in 1957.41 
In Rowland v. Christian,42 the California Supreme Court replaced the 
traditional liability rules based on entrant status with a duty of ordinary 
care. In doing so, the court stated that "[ w ]hatever may have been the 
historical justifications for the common law distinctions, it is clear that 
those distinctions are not justified in the light of our modern society." 43 
Lodge, 39 Cal. App. 3d 1, 113 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1974); Beard v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. 
Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129," 84 Cal. Rptr 449 (1970). 
38. Prosser, supra note I, at 435. 
39. 91 Cal. 296, 27 P. 666 (1891). The defendant, a railroad company, 
maintained a railroad turntable within a quarter-mile of where several small children 
resided with their families. The turntable was secured by a latch and slot to keep it from 
turning, which was customary in the industry, but it was not protected by any inclosure 
or lock. Children frequently played on the turntable and had been observed by the 
defendant's employees. The plaintiff, an eight-year-old child, had gotten on the turntable 
for a ride and, while on it, caught his leg between the table and the rail. The leg had 
to be amputated. The California Supreme Court reasoned that if such an injury was 
reasonably to have been anticipated and the defendant did not provide adequate 
safeguards, the defendant railroad was guilty of negligence. The court acknowledged 
that young children were incapable of exercising the reasonable care of a more mature 
individual and that additional precautions were required to protect them from dangerous 
conditions. Id. at 302-03, 27 P. at 667. The California decision came 18 years after the 
leading United States Supreme Court case, Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 
(1873) (similarly involving children playing on a railroad turntable). 
40. Gulbis, supra note 32, at 296 n.2. 
41. Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31 (Eng.). 
42. 69 Cal. 2d 108,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The plaintiff had been 
invited to defendant's apartment as a social guest. While using the bathroom fixtures, 
the plaintiff injured his hand on a cracked faucet. The defendant had been aware of the 
defect and had advised her lessors of the problem a month before-the incident. Id. at 
110, 443 P.2d at 562, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 98. The California Supreme Court found for the 
plaintiff, and, although it could have based its decision on the traditional duty of care 
owed toward a licensee ( duty to warn of dangerous condition known by landowner when 
there is reason to believe that the licensee would not discover the condition by himself), 
the court went much further and declared that all landowners owed an ordinary duty of 
care as described by California Civil Code§ 1714. Id. at 119,443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. at 104. For the text of§ 1714, see infra note 44. 
43. Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103. 
865 
The court adopted the general duty of care requirement of Civil Code 
section 171444 and ordinary negligence principles by stating: 
The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in 
accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management 
of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of 
injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or 
invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing 
on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.45 
Civil Code section 1714, which was originally enacted by the legislature 
in 1872,46 provided the basic measure of liability. Exceptions to the 
ordinary duty of care were not allowed unless they were provided by a 
statutory provision or clear public policy.47 Entrant classifications no 
longer supported public policy. 
The decision also affected the Restatement of Torts rule involving 
trespassing children. This rule described certain situations in which the 
landowner would owe a greater duty of care to trespassers if they were 
children.48 However, once a duty of ordinary care to all entrants was 
required of property owners, trespassing children no longer required the 
rule's special, although limited, protection.49 Rowland v. Christian 
imposed a duty of care not limited by the requirements of the Restate-
ment rule. A trespasser, regardless of whether a child or an adult, would 
now be owed the same duty of care as any entrant onto an owner's land. 
Because entrant classifications were now immaterial in determining 
liability, it followed that the exceptions to the those classifications were 
also immaterial. 50 Section 1714 provided a more favorable duty of care 
to all entrants, and so the limited protection afforded by the Restatement 
rule for trespassing children was no longer necessary.s1 
Although Rowland v. Christian abolished the traditional entrant 
classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee, the decision had little 
44. CAL. Civ. CODE§ 1714 (West 1985). Subsection (a) states: 
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for 
an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the 
management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully 
or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. 
45. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. 
46. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1714 (West 1985). 
47. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. 
48. See supra note 37 for the text of RESTATEMENT § 339. 
49. Smith v. Americania Motor Lodge, 39 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 113 Cal. Rptr. 771, 
774 (1974); Beard v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 135-36, 84 Cal. 
Rptr. 449, 454 (1970). Compare RESTATEMENT§ 339, supra note 37 (text of attractive 
nuisance doctrine) with CAL. Crv. CODE § 1714, supra note 44 (ordinary care 
requirement). 
50. Beard, 4 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454. 
51. Id. 
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effect on the recreational use statute. Prior to Rowland, section 846 was 
said to remove the legal classification of invitee or licensee (and the 
corresponding duty owed) from anyone permitted to enter an owner's 
property for fishing, hunting, camping, or other recreational uses.52 
The duty owed to such entrants was similar to the duty owed to a 
trespasser prior to Rowland. Even after the traditional classifications 
were no longer to be used in determining liability, if an entrant was 
considered a recreational user under the terms of the statute, then a 
different set of rules for determining liability would apply. The statutory 
limitations on liability provided by section 846, as an exception to the 
general duty of care required by section 1714, were not mentioned in 
Rowland. Additionally, the scope of Rowland did not involve recre-
ational uses, and furthermore, the court did not have the power to 
invalidate that legislation unless it was in conflict with the California or 
United States Constitutions.53 The immunities granted to landowners 
who opened their land for recreational uses continued to exist. 
Rather than narrowing landowner immunities after Rowland, the 
legislature broadened the scope of immunities granted by enacting a 
series of amendments to section 846. In 1970, the legislature amended 
section 846 to include riding among the enumerated activities.54 In 
1971, rock collecting was added55 and in 1972, riding was expanded to 
include animal and all types of vehicular riding.56 In 1976, spelunking 
was added.57 In 1978, the wording of the statute was changed so that 
[a]n owner of any estate in real property owes no duty of care to keep the 
premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose .... 
A "recreational purpose," as used in this section, includes such activities as 
fishing, hunting, camping, water sports, hiking, spelunking, riding, including 
animal riding, snowmobiling, and all other types of vehicular riding, rock 
collecting, sightseeing, picnicking, nature study, nature contacting, recreatienal 
gardening, gleaning, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, 
archaeological, scenic, natural, or scientific sites. 58 
52. 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 647 (1963). 
53. English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 730-31, 136 Cal. 
Rptr. 224, 227-28 (1977), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation 
Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. 
Rptr. 494,499 (1983). See infra note 73 for a discussion of the effect of Delta Farms. 
54. Act of Sept. 2, 1970, ch. 807, § 1, 1970 Cal. Stat. 1530. 
55. Act of Oct. 13, 1971, ch. 1028, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 1975. 
56. Act of Dec. 11, 1972, ch. 1200, § 1, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2322. 
57. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1303, § 1, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5858-59. 
58. Act of Apr. 6, 1978, ch. 86, § l, 1978 Cal. Stat. 221 ( emphasis added). 
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Sport parachuting was added to the list of included activities in 1979.59 
In 1980, the legislature amended the landowner definition to include "an 
owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether 
possessory or nonpossessory."6° Finally, hang gliding was added to the 
list of activities in 1988.61 None of the amendments includes a 
statement of legislative intent, but it is apparent that the 1978 amend-
ment marked a major move away from activities limited to those 
normally conducted on park land to include such diverse activities as 
recreational gardening and rock collecting, which have no association 
with the increasing burden on state and national park land. The 
legislature may have wanted to avoid artificially limiting the kinds of 
recreational activities that would trigger immunity on land held open, or 
it may have had a different intent. Until 1993 the courts continued, 
however, to assume a legislative intent consistent with the legislative 
59. Act of June 27, 1979, ch. 150, § l, 1979 Cal. Stat. 347. 
60. Act of July 10, 1980, ch. 408, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 797. 
61. Act of June 1, 1988, ch. 129, § l, 1988 Cal. Stat. 507. The full text of the 
current statute is: 
An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, .whether 
possessory or nonpossessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe 
for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning 
of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to 
persons entering for such purpose, except as provided in this section. 
A "recreational purpose," as used in this section, includes such activities as 
fishing, hunting, camping, water sports, hiking, spelunking, sport parachuting, 
riding, including animal riding, snowmobiling, and all other types of vehicular 
riding, rock collecting, sightseeing, picnicking, nature study, nature contacting, 
recreational gardening, gleaning, hang gliding, winter sports, and viewing or 
enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, natural, or scientific sites. 
An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether 
possessory or nonpossessory, who gives permission to another for entry or use 
for the above purpose upon the premises does not thereby (a) extend any 
assurance that the premises are safe for such purpose, or (b) constitute the 
person to whom permission has been granted the legal status of an invitee or 
licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, or ( c) assume responsibility for or 
incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by any act of such 
person to whom permission has been granted except as provided in this 
section. 
This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful 
or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, 
structure or activity; or (b) for injury suffered in any case where permission 
to enter for the above purpose was granted for a consideration other than the 
consideration, if any, paid to said landowner by the state, or where consider-
ation has been received from others for the same purpose; or ( c) to any 
persons who are expressly invited rather than merely permitted to come upon 
the premises by the landowner. 
Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury 
to person or property. 
CAL. Crv. CODE§ 846 (West Supp. 1995). 
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intent articulated in other states' statutes and with the suggested state 
legislation of 1965, that is, to encourage landowners to hold open their 
property for recreational use without fear of liability for injury due to 
that use.62 However, the new language, absent a statement of legisla-
tive intent, opened the door for a wide variety of interpretations that 
seemed to move away from the presumed original intent of the 
legislature. 
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CALIFORNIA'S 
RECREATIONAL USE STATUTE 
Despite the work of the legislature in broadening the scope of the 
recreational use statute between 1963 and 1978, little case law appeared 
prior to 1977. 63 In fact, although approximately one-third of the states 
had enacted similar statutes prior to the appearance of the model 
62. See, e.g., SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 14 (text of statement 
of purpose). Many states have enacted specific statements of purpose as part of the 
actual legislation. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 35-15-20 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 33-41-101 (West 1990); IDAHO CODE§ 36-1604(a) (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 87.01 
(West 1995). The Alabama legislature expressed an intent similar to many states, 
stating: 
It is hereby declared that there is a need for outdoor recreation areas in this 
state which are open for public use and enjoyment; that the use and mainte-
nance of these areas will provide beauty and openness for the benefit of the 
public and also assist in preserving the health, safety, and welfare of the 
population; that it is in the public interest to encourage owners of land to make 
such areas available to the public for non-commercial recreational purposes by 
limiting such owners' liability towards persons entering thereon for such 
purposes; that such limitation on liability would encourage owners of land to 
allow non-commercial public recreational use of land which would not 
otherwise be open to the public, thereby reducing state expenditures needed to 
provide such areas. 
ALA. CODE § 35-15-20 (1991). See also John C. Becker, Landowner or Occupier 
Liability for Personal Injuries and Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective is the 
Protection?, 24 IND. L. REV. 1587 (1991) (discussing provisions of 1965 and 1979 
suggested state legislation and application to specific circumstances); William C. 
Knowles, Landowners' Liability Toward Recreational Users: A Critical Comment, 18 
IDAHO L. REV. 59 (1982) (criticizing generality and wide application); Dean P. Laing, 
Comment, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: A Critical Analysis, 66 MARQ. L. 
REV. 312 (1983) (comparing other states' intent to intent of Wisconsin Legislature); 
Miller, supra note 13 (comparing application of state recreational use statutes). 
63. See English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr. 
224 (1977), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 
(1983). See infra note 73 for a discussion of the effect of Delta Farms. 
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recreational use statute in 1965,64 and a majority had laws in place by 
1972, little commentary or case law existed prior to 1976.65 Beginning 
in 1977, the California courts began to deal with the question of the 
constitutionality of section 846.66 However, in later years, the focus 
shifted to the application of the statute to specific circumstances. As the 
courts attempted to determine the meaning of such vague terms as 
"recreational purpose" and "owner," they consistently drew upon the 
presumed intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Rather than 
apply the statute literally to every situation that could come under the 
heading of recreation, the courts selectively granted immunity to 
landowners only when immunity would support the .purpose of the 
statute - "to reduce the growing tendency of landowners to withdraw 
land from recreational access by removing the risk of gratuitous tort 
liability that a landowner might run unless he could successfully bar any 
entry to his property for ... recreational use:" 67 As late as 1990, the 
California Supreme Court acknowledged this goal when it utilized the 
presumed statutory purpose of "constrain[ing] the growing tendency of 
private landowners to bar public access to their land for recreational 
uses" and "encourag[ing] property owners to allow the general public to 
engage in recreational activities" to decide that a grazing interest in 
federal property was a sufficient property interest to warrant the 
immunity of section 846.68 In 1993 the interpretation of the statute was 
64. SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 11, at 150. 
65. Laing, supra note 62, at 316. 
66. See English, 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224; Lostritto v. Southern 
Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977). 
67. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228; see also Hubbard v. 
Brown, 50 Cal. 3d 189, 192, 785 P.2d 1183, 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. 491, 491-92 (1990); 
Delta Fanns Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707-08, 660 
P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (1983); Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 
362, 367, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 (1990); Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 
3d 1003, 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681,683 (1988); Domingue v. Presley ofS. Cal., 197 Cal. 
App. 3d 1060, 1066, 243 Cal. Rptr. 312,315 (1988); Charpentier v. Von Geldem, 191 
Cal. App. 3d 101, 108, 236 Cal. Rptr. 233, 236-37 (1987); Collins v. Tippett, 156 Cal. 
App. 3d 1017, 1019-20, 203 Cal. Rptr. 366, 367 (1984); Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 
Cal. App. 3d 727, 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161 (1983); Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 
134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 868-69 (1982); Gerkin v. Santa Clara 
Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1026, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615 (1979); Smith 
v. Scrap Disposal Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 525, 529, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134, 137 (1979). 
68. Hubbard, 50 Cal. 3d at 193-94, 785 P.2d at 1184-85, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93. 
The court detennined that the legislative intent was to expand statutory immunity, even 
if the interest holder could not exclude the public. Id. at 197,785 P.2d at 1187, 266 
Cal. Rptr. at 495. Even though the actual owner of the land was a public entity, the 
interest held by the defendant-a federal grazing pennit-was sufficient to invoke the 
immunity of the statute. Id. 
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expanded even further to apply to land that had already been withdrawn 
from public use and was no longer suitable for public recreation. 69 
A. Validity of the Recreational Use Statute 
The original text of the 1963 recreational use statute declared that 
when a landowner gave permission to use private property for specific 
recreational activities, the landowner was not giving the user the legal 
entrant status of invitee or licensee.70 In fact, as stated by the Califor-
nia State Bar Journal, the invitee or licensee status (and corresponding 
duty owed) did not apply to anyone entering the landowner's property 
for recreational use.71 However, in 1968, in Rowland v. Christian, the 
California Supreme Court abandoned the traditional entrant classifica-
tions and declared that a property owner owed a duty of ordinary care 
to all entrants, regardless of classification.72 The Rowland decision did · 
not mention the entrant status of a recreational user granted by 
legislation. In 1977, the First District Court of Appeal addressed the 
issue of whether the recreational user status and immunization from a 
requirement of due care remained in effect even after Rowland v. 
Christian.73 The facts of English v. Marin Municipal Water District 
clearly fall within the requirements for immunity under section 846 as 
it existed at the time. A motorcyclist was riding for recreational 
purposes on the defendant water district's land when he was injured 
falling over a man-made precipice.74 The plaintiff did not dispute the 
applicability of the statute to the facts. He did, however, challenge the 
continued validity of section 846, contending that after Rowland v. 
69. Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1112, 847 P.2d 560, 571, 17 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 594, 605 (1993) (en bane) (Panelli, J., dissenting). 
70. Act of July 17, 1963, ch. 1759, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stat. 3511-12. 
71. 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 647, 647 (1963). 
72. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). 
73. English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224 
(1977), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. 
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 
(1983). The English court applied § 846 without addressing the fact that the property 
involved was publicly owned. The California Supreme Court later disapproved the 
holding of English (as well as Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 
3d 1022, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1979)) when it decided that§ 846 did not apply to public 
property. Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 
707,660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494,499 (1983). 
74. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 727, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26. 
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Christian, landowners owed a duty of reasonable care, as described by 
California Civil Code section 1714, to all entrants regardless of 
classification.75 The court determined that any exceptions to section 
1714 must be based on legislative enactment or public policy, although 
a legislative enactment such as section 846 is a statement of public 
policy.76 The court stated it did not have the power to invalidate 
legislation unless it was determined to be unconstitutional. 77 In 
addition, the court found that amendments· to section 846 after the 
Rowland decision show a legislative policy to broaden the scope of 
immunity granted by expanding the list of recreational uses so that 
private land would continue to be available for public recreational 
use.78 
Although the English court did not address the issue of constitutional-
ity, this question was raised soon afterward in two appellate court 
decisions, Lostritto v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,79 decided 
in 1977, and Parish v. Lloyd,80 decided in 1978. In 1977, when the 
Lostritto case was decided, the recreational use statute listed specific 
activities to which the statute applied. A property owner was immunized 
only against entrants who came onto the property for fishing, hunting, 
camping, water sports, hiking, spelunking, animal and vehicular riding, 
rock collecting, and sightseeing.81 The plaintiff in Lostritto, a sixteen-
year-old minor, had entered the defendant's property to dive into the San 
Lorenzo River from a railroad trestle that was owned by the defendant. 
He broke his neck and became a quadriplegic when he dove into the 
water, which was too shallow due to :fluctuating currents.82 The court 
determined that diving was a water sport, and that the plaintiff's 
recreational purpose brought the case under section 846 and immunized 
the property owner from a requirement of due care. 83 The plaintiff did 
not object to this finding, but instead based his challenge on the 
constitutionality of the statute. The 'plaintiff contended that the statute 
denied equal protection on the basis ofunderinclusion, because it singled 
out only certain types of recreation, and therefore limited classes of 
75. Id. at 729, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 227. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a) (enacted 
1872), supra note 44. 
76. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 227. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 731, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228. 
79. 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977). 
80. 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1978). 
81. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1303, § 1, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5858-59. 
82. Lostritto, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 743, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 907. 
83. Id. at 747, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10. 
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persons who might recover damages. 84 The plaintiff also made a claim 
of overinclusion, in that the immunity was granted unnecessarily to 
property unsuitable for recreation and so did not support the purpose of 
the legislation.85 The basis of the constitutional challenge was that the 
statute created unreasonable categories that violated equal protection and 
did not further the goal of limiting the withdrawal of private land from 
recreational use by the public.86 
The court responded to the challenge of underinclusion by stating that 
the specified activities were "mostly the major ones which would be 
undertaken by entrants to the property of another."87 The court stated 
that the activities appeared to have been singled out by the legislature 
because they are the activities in which accidents may be most likely to 
occur, due to the large number of people who participate in those 
activities and the large amount of area that is required to conduct such 
activities.88 In addition, the activities listed in the statute are the major 
ones that would be supported by having private land available to ease 
the burden on the demand for space in public areas. The simple fact 
that the statute omitted some lesser sports did not support the plaintiff's 
underinclusion argument. Accordingly, the court ruled that there was no 
"offensive discrimination" in the statute because it provided limited 
protection "for the benefit of landowner and visitor alike."89 In 
addressing the challenge of overinclusion, the court stated that even 
though the statute might grant immunity in some cases that did not 
support the intent to discourage the withdrawal of private land, the 
statutory classification did have a rational relationshit to a legitimate end 
and so would not be considered unconstitutional. In addition, the 
statute was limited to the described activities, and the legislature may 
have decided that it was unfair to hold. the landowner liable when the 
property was used for those purposes.91 
84. Id. at 747, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910. 
85. Id. at 749, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 911. 
86. Id. at 747, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 748, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910. 
89. Id. at 748, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11. 
90. Id. at 749, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 911. 
91. Id. 
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A second constitutional challenge soon followed in 1978. In Parish 
v. Lloyd,92 the plaintiff claimed that because the statute immunized 
owners against recreational trespassers but required due care in the case 
of nonrecreational trespassers, the classifications were arbitrary and 
denied him equal protection. The court examined whether the classifica-
tions had a "rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose"93 and 
decided that exempting owners from a due care requirement only for 
recreational users furthered the goal of encouraging private owners to 
allow the public to recreate by limiting exposure to tort liability.94 
B. Application Based on Legislative Intent: The Suitability 
Exception 
Following the legislature's expansion of the recreational use statute in 
1978 to include "any recreational purpose,"95 a series of decisions 
focused on how to apply this potentially broad immunization to specific 
cases where an uninvited entrant was injured on the landowner's 
property. The recurring theme in the application of the statute was 
whether immunization supported the intent of the legislature to 
encourage recreational usage on private land in each instance.96 
The First District Court of Appeal was the first appellate court to 
decide whether to apply a broad, literal wording of the statute to a case 
that might not otherwise come under section 846. A minor slipped and 
fell while walking her bicycle across a bridge made of planks located on 
the defendant's property.97 The court held that this activity would not 
be considered either hiking or riding, when the intent of the plaintiff was 
not recreational in nature. The court stated that the statute "must be 
92. 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1978). 
93. Id. at 787, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 432. 
94. Id. at 788, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 432. 
95. Act of Apr. 6, 1978, ch. 86, § 1, 1978 Cal. Stat. 221. 
96. See, e.g., Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 367, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 
60 (1990); Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. 
681,685 (1988); Domingue v. Presley ofS. Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1066, 243 Cal. 
Rptr. 312,316 (1988); Charpentier v. Von Geldem, 191 Cal. App. 3d 101,108,236 Cal. 
Rptr. 233, 237 (1987); Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 
1313, 240 Cal. Rptr. 142, 146-47 (1987); Collins v. Tippett, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 
1019-20, 203 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1984); Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 
727, 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161 (1983); Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 
3d 860, 864, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1982); Smith v. Scrap Disposal Corp., 96 Cal. 
App. 3d 525, 529, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134, 137 (1979). 
97. Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1025, 157 
Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1979), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation 
Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. 
Rptr. 494,499 (1983). See supra note 73 for a discussion of the effect of Delta Farms. 
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construed in light of the legislative purpose behind it"98 and that "a 
purely literal interpretation of any part of a statute will not prevail over 
the purpose of the legislation."99 This idea would form the basis for 
a consistent line of decisions applying the statute until the Ornelas 
decision in 1993. 
After the legislature broadened the wording of section 846 in 1978 to 
include any recreational purpose, the courts began to focus their attention 
on whether the property in question should be granted immunity from 
a due care requirement that would otherwise apply to nonrecreational 
entrants. The first such question raised regarding the applicability of the 
statute was decided by the Third District Court of Appeal in Nelson v. 
City of Gridley. 100 When a motorcyclist was injured after striking a 
cable stretched across a public street, the issue raised was whether the 
immunity granted by the recreational use statute would apply to publicly 
owned property. 101 The court based its decision that the statute did not 
apply to public property on previous decisions regarding the constitution-
ality of the statute, where the immunity granted was related to the 
legitimate goal of encouraging landowners to keep property open for 
recreational purposes.102 The court determined that immunity for 
public property would not support the purpose of the legislature - to 
encourage recreational usage. 1 3 Granting immunity to recreational 
users of a public street would not encourage landowners to keep property 
open for recreational use. In such a situation, there would be no rational 
basis for the distinction between injuries to recreational users compared 
to users of the street for other purposes. 104 This decision was ap-
proved by the California Supreme Court in Delta Farms v. Superior 
Court. 105 
98. Gerkin, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 1025, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 615. 
99. Id. at 1027, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 615. 
100. 113 Cal. App. 3d 87, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1980). 
101. Id. at 91, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 759. 
102. Id.; see also Parish v. Lloyd, 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1978); 
Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977); 
discussion accompanying notes 79-94, supra. 
103. Nelson, 113 Cal. App. 3d at 91, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 759. 
104. Id. 
105. See Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 
699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983); see also infra discussion accompanying 
notes 167-71. 
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The Nelson rationale was further supported by the Second District 
Court of Appeal in a pair of decisions introducing a judicially created 
exception to the recreational use statute. In 1982, the appellate court 
decided that some types of property were not suitable for recreational 
purposes. In Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 106 a ten-year-old boy was 
riding his bicycle over an open trench while playing a game with some 
friends at a construction site. The boy was injured when he fell into the 
trench. 107 The court would not allow immunity for the construction 
site owners even though the nature of the activity was recreational and 
would come under the statute if interpreted literally. The court looked 
to the purpose of the recreational use statute in deciding that "the 
Legislature could not have intended to encourage owners and building 
contractors to allow children to play on their temporary construction 
projects."108 This exception to the immunity granted by the recreation-
al use statute was solidified in Potts v. Halsted Financial Corp., 109 
which involved a similar injury to a minor at a construction site. The 
court recognized that granting immunity in a situation where the 
property was unsuitable for recreation and had, in fact, already been 
withdrawn from recreational use by the public, would not support the 
legislature's purpose of encouraging recreational access. 110
This suitability exception was utilized by the appellate courts for ten 
years in an attempt to avoid results that presumably could not have been 
intended by the legislature in enacting the statute. An owner of 
electrical lines was granted immunity when a minor was injured by a 
hanging guy wire even though the lines would not be considered suitable 
for recreation. 111 The court's theory was that the statute still applied 
because the property underneath the electrical wires was undeveloped 
and open to anyone for such recreational purposes as riding and hiking. 
The court believed this to be true even though the defendant electrical 
company did not own the property-it only had permission to use the 
land. 112 Immunity for this nonpossessory interest would be granted 
under the 1980 amendment to the statute113 and would support the 
legislative purpose of keeping private property open for recreation. The 
106. Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 
870 (1982). 
107. Id. at 862, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 868. 
108. Id. at 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 869. 
109. 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1983). 
110. Id. at 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 162. 
111. Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1314, 240 Cal. 
Rptr. 142, 147 (1987). 
112. Id. 
113. Act of July 10, 1980, ch. 408, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 797. 
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court wished to avoid a situation where the owner who grants the 
easement is protected by section 846 while the owner of a structure or 
facility on the property is not protected.114 
In a case similar to the Paige and Potts decisions involving minors 
trespassing on construction sites, the appellate court refused to grant 
immunity to the owner of land that had been graded for future develop-
ment when a minor was injured while bicycle riding. 115 Although the 
property had previously been undeveloped pasture land, the defendant's 
action of grading withdrew the land from recreational use. The court 
recognized that when a developer begins work on land in preparation for 
construction, the developer is using his private property for his own 
purpose. Application of section 846, with its intent to keep private 
property open for recreational use, would interfere with the developer's 
use of his land. 116 The court noted that "section 846 may not be 
construed without considering the intent of the Legislature in enacting 
it"117 and that a "'purely literal interpretation of any part of a statute 
will not prevail over the purpose of the legislation. "'118 The Third 
114. Colvin, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1314, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 147. 
115. Domingue v. Presley ofS. Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1070, 243 Cal. Rptr. 
312, 318 (1988). 
116. Id. at 1066, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16; see also Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 
204 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1988). The incident in Wineinger took 
place in a residential housing tract that the defendant was developing. The streets in the 
development were in the process of being graded and paved. One night, the plaintiff and 
two friends drove on one of the streets in the development that had been paved, but was 
still unlighted. Id. at 1006, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 682. The plaintiff was injured when the 
vehicle drove over the edge of a 30-foot ravine where the road ended. Id. The court 
determined that § 846 did not apply because the property had been withdrawn from 
recreational use by the public, and, in fact, that "[f]ree recreational use by the public 
during such development would interfere with that developer's purpose and use of its 
private property and is consequently not encouraged." Id. at 1009, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 
684-85. But see Smith v. Scrap Disposal Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 525, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134 
(1979). In Smith, immunity under § 846 was available to the defendant based on the 
right to bar ingress. The adult plaintiff had entered Scrap's property allegedly to ride 
on a bulldozer. Without discussion of the owner's intentions for the property (whether 
it was held open for or suitable for recreational use), the court held that whether the 
statute would apply would be based on the plaintiff's intent in entering the property. Id. 
at 529, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 137. 
117. Domingue, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1067, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 316. 
118. Id. at 1066, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (quoting Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water 
Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1027, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612,615 (1979), disapproved on other 
grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 
707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494,499 (1983)). See also infra notes 121-22 
and accompanying text. 
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District Court of Appeal also raised the issue of withdrawal when it 
determined that an undeveloped urban lot could be considered suitable 
for recreation when the owner had done nothing to withdraw the land 
from public recreational use. 119 Immunity would be granted to the 
owner when children climbing trees on the lot were injured.120 
The appellate courts have used many accepted doctrines of judicial 
interpretation in deciding recreational use cases. The statute began with 
a list of specific activities in which immunity would be granted to the 
landowner. Although the statute contained no explicit legislative 
purpose, application was not difficult when the list of possible recre-
ational uses was so exclusive. The legislature further clarified its 
purpose by broadening the statute, at first through additional covered 
activities and finally by including any recreational use, as defined by 
(but not limited to) a list of recreational activities. 121 Primarily, the 
appellate courts relied on legislative intent over a literal interpreta-
tion. 122 The courts have also been aided by the examples of recre-
ational uses provided by the statute. If the legislature had meant to 
immunize all owners from every recreational use of their property 
regardless of the type of property or the kind of recreation, a list of 
activities would be unnecessary. "[A] construction which implies that 
words used by the legislature were superfluous is to be avoided wherever 
possible."123 Even after section 846 was broadened to include "any 
119. Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 370, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 62 (1990). 
120. Id. at 371, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 62. 
121. Act of Apr. 6, 1978, ch. 86, § 1, 1978 Cal. Stat. 221. Prior to 1978, the courts 
were faced with situations that involved the activities specified in the statute, but were 
not recreational. An appellate court considered, but rejected, a literal interpretation of 
the statute when it noted that, read .literally, the statute would immunize any property 
owner from liability for the condition of his road when a person drove his car onto the 
property. Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1027, 157 
Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1979), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation 
Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699,707,660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. 
Rptr. 494, 499 (1983). The court decided that the legislature's intent controlled, 
meaning only to apply to recreational vehicle activity. Id. 
122. See, e.g., Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1067 n.2, 
243 Cal. Rptr. 312, 316 n.2 (1988) (quoting Select Base Materials v. Board of 
Equalization, 51 Cal. 2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672 (1959)) ("The most fundamental rule 
of statutory construction is that 'the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature 
so as to effectuate the purpose of the law."'); Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. 
App. 3d 1003, 1009, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (1988) ("[The statute] may not be 
construed without considering the intent of the Legislature in enacting it."); Potts v. 
Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161 (1983) ("Statutes 
must be given a reasonable interpretation and application in accordance with the purpose 
and intention of the Legislature."); Gerkin, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 1027, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 
615 ("A purely literal interpretation of any part of a statute will not prevail over the 
purpose of the legislation."). 
123. Gerkin, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 1027, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 615. 
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recreational purpose," the legislature continued to add to the list of 
examples following those words. 124 Because the added list must be 
interpreted to provide meaning to the term "recreational purpose," 
recreational purpose must include activities similar to those enumerated 
in the statute.125 Finally, the suitability exception was first applied by 
the courts with the Paige v. North Oaks Partners decision in 1982.126 
For the next ten years, the courts continued to apply this exception to 
limit the immunity provided by section 846.127 During this period, the 
legislature amended the statute to include hang gliding in the list of 
enumerated activities. 128 It could reasonably be presumed that the 
legislature, in discussing expansion of immunity, would have taken 
action on a judicial interpretation limiting the immunity if it had 
disagreed. In contrast, in 1980, the legislature took action after just two 
1979 decisions denied immunity to holders of nonpossesory interests in 
land. 129 The statute was amended to include any interest in land, 
"whether possessory or nonpossessory."130 
In 1993, the California Supreme Court ended the judicial limitation 
placed on the recreational use statute by the suitability exception. 
124. See Act of June 27, 1979, ch. 150, § 1, 1979 Cal. Stat. 347; Act of July 10, 
1980, ch. 408, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 797. 
125. E.g., Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1114, 847 P.2d 560, 573, 17 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 594,607 (1993) (en bane) (Panelli, J., dissenting); Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. 
App. 3d 362, 369, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 60-61 (1990). The principle of ejusdem generis 
provides that in listing specific examples following general words, the general words will 
extend only to those similar in nature to the examples listed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 517 (6th ed. 1990). 
126. 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1982). 
127. See Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1990) 
(vacant lot in urban area with tree used for climbing was suitable for recreational use); 
Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 243 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1988) (land 
graded for development was withdrawn from public use and no longer suitable); 
Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1988) 
(residential tract being developed was withdrawn from public recreational use); Potts v. 
Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1983) (construction site 
not suitable); Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867 
(1982) (temporary construction project not suitable for recreation). 
128. Act of June 1, 1988, ch. 129, § 1, 1988 Cal. Stat. 507. 
129. See Darr v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 94 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157 Cal Rptr. 90 
( 1979) ( owner of easement to cross American River who had built bridge was not owner 
of estate in real property to which statute applied); O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co., 97 
Cal. App. 3d 903, 159 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1979) (license allowing stockpiling of dirt was 
not possessory interest; statute did not apply). 
130. Act of July 10, 1980, ch. 408, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 797. 
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Ornelas v. Randolph131 involved an eight-year-old child who trespassed 
on property owned by a neighbor. Part of the property was made up of 
an open area where old farm equipment, machinery, and irrigation pipes 
were stored. Six children entered that area to climb and play on the 
equipment, from which a metal pipe broke off and struck the plain-
tiff.132 The court found that the children's purpose in entering the land 
was to play, and so their activity fell within the statute, based on its 
phrase "any recreational purpose." The court acknowledged the 
principle of ejusdem generis, however, it could find no characteristic 
shared by the listed activities that would limit the meaning of "recre-
ational purpose."133 The first conclusion of the supreme court was that 
"entering and using defendant's property to play on his farm equipment 
invokes the immunity provisions of section 846" and that "clambering 
about on farm equipment is no different in kind from scaling a cliff or 
climbing a tree."134 As the court stated, the child was taking "advan-
tage of the recreational opportunities offered by the property."135 
The court then turned to analyze the history of the recreational use 
statute, especially the prior judicial recognition of the suitability 
exception. Section 846 contains only two statutory requirements: (1) an 
injury must result from the use of private property for a recreational 
purpose and (2) that injury must occur on land in which the owner has 
a possessory or nonpossessory interest. The suitability exception was 
developed by the courts to encourage owners to allow the public to use 
their land for recreational purposes. If the property was not suitable for 
recreation, then the goal in allowing immunity would not be served. 
The Ornelas court declined to recognize this interpretation, noting that 
the plain language of the statute provides no exceptions.136 The court 
held that a literal interpretation of the statute to include any private 
property would not lead to the absurd results described by some of the 
appellate court decisions. Because the statute was determined to be clear 
and unambiguous, the court refused to allow a construction of the statute 
that included a nonstatutory element. 137 Further, the court decided that 
the intent of the legislature could reasonably have been to provide 
immunity to any property owner when a trespasser is injured on that 
131. 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1098, 847 P.2d 560, 561, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 595 (1993) 
(en bane). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 1101, 847 P.2dat563, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597. See generally supra note 
124 and accompanying text. 
134. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598. 
135. Id. at 1102, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598. 
136. Id. at 1105, 84 7 P .2d at 566, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600. 
137. Id. at 1105-06 n.8, 847 P.2d at 567 n.8, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 n.8. 
880 
[VOL. 32: 857, 1995] Recreational Use 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
property (so long as the trespasser is "recreating"). 138 The determina-
tion of whether property was suitable for recreation was to be placed on 
the user when the property was entered, and any potential injury would 
be at the user's risk. 139 
In discussing the suitability exception, the court found that all prior 
applications of the exception involved construction sites, most with 
injuries to minors. The Ornelas case appeared, however, to be the first 
time the appellate courts had extended the exception beyond such 
property. The supreme court majority noted that the land in this case 
was not developed, was indisputably agricultural, and questioned whether 
criteria for determining suitability could be found that would allow 
consistent and certain application of the statute. 140 In addition, a 
suitability exception would have the anomalous effect of denying 
immunity to owners who had attempted to restrict trespassing. The court 
determined that the statute "applies to lands that are fenced as readily as 
those that are open."141 For these reasons, suitability for recreation as 
a criterion for immunity was rejected. Justice George, in a concurring 
opinion, agreed with the majority opinion due to the language of section 
846. He acknowledged the dissent's argument that a child injured while 
trespassing on private property to play would be treated more severely 
than an adult trespassing on the same property for illegal purposes, but 
determined the same disparity would exist whether the property were 
suitable for recreation or not.142 Justice George concurred although the 
result was "unfortunate," because he believed only the legislature could 
rewrite the statute. 143 
138. Id. at 1105, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601. 
139. Id. at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601. 
140. Id. at 1107, 847 P.2d at 567-68, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601. 
141. Id. at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602. 
142. Id. at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569-70, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (George, J., 
concurring). Justice George also dissented from the appellate court decision in 
Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., stating that the mere grading of part of 10 acres of 
property did not make the land unsuitable for recreation. Domingue v. Presley of S. 
Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1079, 243 Cal. Rptr. 312, 324 (1988) (George, J., 
dissenting). Although his major argument appeared to be that the land was suitable for 
recreation, he also stated that application of the suitability exception to the facts of the 
case was not supported by the language of the statute or by precedent and was best left 
to legislative amendment. Id. 
143. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1110, 847 P.2d at 570, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604. 
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The three dissenting justices144 believed that the legislature had 
acquiesced to the suitability exception over a ten-year period that 
included legislative amendments to section 846.145 The immunity 
allowed by the recreational use statute, an exception to the ordinary duty 
of care owed to all entrants, is granted only after the trade-off of a gain 
in open, recreational areas. Without the suitability exception, immunity 
is granted in certain categories of accidents without supporting the 
legitimate state purpose of encouraging increased recreational areas. 146 
Justice Panelli noted that "[t]he majority's interpretation of section 846 
permits the exception created by that section to swallow the general duty 
of care in practically all nonbusiness contexts."147 The Ornelas 
decision therefore appears to resurrect the traditional common-law 
categories of entrants and their corresponding no-duty rules abolished by 
the same court in Rowland v. Christian in 1968.148 
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF TRESPASSING CHILDREN IN 
CALIFORNIA 
When California's recreational use statute was first enacted, the 
traditional common-law entrant classifications of invitee, licensee, and 
trespasser determined the duty of care required by any landowner. 149 
Section 846 was geared toward these classifications, stating that granting 
permission to use a property for recreational purposes did not convey 
"the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is 
owed."150 An exception to the no-duty rule for trespassers had, 
however, been accepted by the California Supreme Court since 1891 151 
and had long been a part of the standard of care that landowners owed 
trespassers in California. 152 Although the earlier cases strictly held the 
144. Justices Panelli, Mosk, and Kennard. 
145. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at llll, 847 P.2d at 570-71, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604-05 
(Panelli, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying notes 126-30. 
146. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1112, 847 P.2d at 571, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605. 
147. Id. 
148. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 
(1968); see also supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
149. See WITKIN, supra note 21, § 912. 
150. Act of July 17, 1963, ch. 1759, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stat. 3511. 
151. See Barrett v. Southern Pac. Co., 91 Cal. 296, 27 P. 666 (1891). For an 
explanation of the Barrett case, see supra note 39. 
152. See, e.g., Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959); Garcia 
v. Soogian, 52 Cal. 2d 107, 338 P.2d 433 (1959); King v. Lennen, 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 
P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1959); Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48 
(1958); Knight v. Kaiser Co., 48 Cal. 2d 778,312 P.2d 1089 (1957); Cahill v. E.B. & 
A.L. Stone & Co., 153 Cal. 571, 96 P. 84 (1908); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 
P. 113 (1896); Helguera v. Cirone, 178 Cal. App. 2d 232, 3 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1960); Davis 
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liability requirements of the attractive nuisance doctrine to its elements, 
the California Supreme Court began expanding application of the rule 
around the same time as the recreational use statute was enacted. In 
1957, the California Supreme Court decided Knight v. Kaiser Co., 153 
in which a sandpile was ruled not to constitute an attractive nuisance due 
to its common occurrence. Interestingly, in a dissenting opinion, Justice 
Traynor foreshadowed the change in entrant liability rules that would 
follow in the 1968 decision of Rowland v. Christian. Traynor disagreed 
that the sandpile, as a matter of law, did not constitute an attractive 
nuisance. 154 He based his dissent on the facts of the case, stating that 
not all children would have been aware of the dangers presented by an 
industrial sandpile. He felt that each case should be decided on its 
specific circumstances, rather than creating a blanket ''sandpile rule."155 
All of the other requirements for application of the attractive nuisance 
doctrine were present--children were accustomed to playing on the 
sandpile, the defendant knew or should have known of their presence, 
the children were unable to realize the risk due to their age, reasonable 
protections were not taken, and the protections were not so burdensome 
as to interfere with the use of the site. Traynor objected to the 
majority's reliance on the categorizations of hazards as nuisances or 
common conditions in determining the required standard of care toward 
children. In quoting the Illinois Supreme Court, he stated that "'[t]he 
naming or labeling of a certain set of facts as being an "attractive 
nuisance' case or a 'turntable' case has often led to undesirable 
conclusions. . . . [T]he only proper basis for decision in such cases 
dealing with personal injuries to children are the customary rules of 
ordinary negligence cases. "'156 
v. Goodrich, 171 Cal. App. 2d 92,340 P.2d 48 (1959); Wilford v. Little, 144 Cal. App. 
2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 599, 207 
P.2d 864 (1949). 
153. 48 Cal. 2d 778, 312 P.2d 1089 (1957). In Knight, the defendant owned and 
maintained a large unenclosed industrial sandpile on which children were in the habit 
of playing. The court found that all the requirements for application of the attractive 
nuisance doctrine were met, however, an exception was made for common conditions 
whose danger was obvious even to children. Id. at 784, 312 P.2d at 1093. 
154. Id. at 789, 312 P.2d at 1096 (Traynor, J., dissenting). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 792,312 P.2d at 1098 (quoting Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E.2d 
836, 841 (Ill. 1955)). Traynor also recognized the possibility of extending Civil Code 
§ 1714 to all trespasser cases; however, he stated the "dilemma of choosing between 
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The courts appeared to follow Traynor's reasoning, expanding the 
protection available to trespassing children in the following years. In 
1959, the California Supreme Court was faced with another case decided 
by the lower court for the plaintiff based on section 339 of the 
Restatement of Torts. Although the supreme court reversed the lower 
court's decision, it stated that "liability must be decided in the light of 
all the circumstances and not by arbitrarily placing cases in rigid 
categories."157 Also in 1959, the California Supreme Court decided 
King v. Lennen, 158 in which the court repeated that each case must be 
decided on its own facts, expressly disapproving Knight v. Kaiser and 
other cases that had effectively established no-duty rules for children 
trespassing in certain circumstances.159 As the First District Court of 
Appeal noted in 1960, the requirements of the attractive nuisance 
doctrine were being interpreted broadly in considering whether specific 
facts regarding trespassing children stated a cause of action. The 
decision would be up to the jury to decide liability based on whether the 
requirements were met. 160 
During this period of expanding protection for children, the legislature 
enacted the recreational use statute. Although the statute did not 
specifically provide an exception for children using private land for 
recreation, the legislature may have decided· that an exception in the 
nature of the attractive nuisance doctrine was not necessary, due to the 
limited activities to which the statute applied. In addition, because the 
entrant was labeled a trespasser (and the landowner thus had no duty of 
care), it is possible that the attractive nuisance doctrine would have 
[adult trespasser] cases and the rule set forth in section 1714 is not now before us." Id. 
at 785-86, 312 P.2d at 1094 (Traynor, J., dissenting). 
157. Garcia v. Soogian, 52 Cal. 2d 107, 110, 338 P.2d 433, 435 (1959). The 
plaintiff was injured while playing on defendant's stacked, prefabricated panels 
containing windows. While holding that the 12-year-old plaintiff should have been· 
aware of the danger, the court also stated that the commonness of a condition had no 
significance apart from the obviousness of the risk. Id. at 111, 338 P.2d at 435. 
158. 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 {1959). 
159. Id. at 344-45, 348 P.2d at 100, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (disapproving Knight v. 
Kaiser Co., 48 Cal. 2d 778,312 P.2d 1089 (1957); Melendez v. City of Los Angeles, 
8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937); Doyle v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 6 Cal. 2d 550, 59 
P.2d 93 (1936); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 P. 113 (1896); Van Winkle v. City 
of King; 149 Cal. App. 2d 500,308 P.2d 512 (1957); Wilford v. Little, 144 Cal. App. 
2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Lopez v. Capitol Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 60, 296 P.2d 63 
(1956); Lake v. Ferrer, 139 Cal. App. 2d 114,293 P.2d 104 (1956); Ward v. Oakley Co., 
125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 271 P.2d 536 (1954); King v. Simons Brick Co., 52 Cal. App. 
2d 586, 126 P.2d 627 (1942); Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. App. 122; 300 
P. 993 (1931); Reardon v. Spring Valley Water Co., 68 Cal. App. 13, 228 P. 406 
(1924)). 
160. Helguera v. Cirone, 178 Cal. App. 2d 232,237, 3 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67 (1960). 
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provided an exception that required a higher standard of care to children 
if the property contained a hazardous condition .. 
An indication that providing protection to children was very much a 
concern of the legislature is seen in the California Tort Claims Act, 161 
which was enacted in the same year as the recreational use statute. The 
Tort Claims Act addresses liability of public entities who open their 
property to recreational users. Section 831.2 of the California Govern-
ment Code provides blanket immunity for injuries caused by natural 
conditions of unimproved public property, 162 and section 831.4 pro-
vides immunity when certain unpaved public roads are used to provide 
access to "fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding ... , water sports, 
recreational or scenic areas."163 However, section 831.8, which 
discusses liability for injuries caused by the condition of a reservoir, 
provides an exception for children under age twelve. Section 831.8( d) 
states: 
Nothing in this section exonerates a public entity or a public employee from 
liability for injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition of property if: 
(1) The person injured was less than 12 years of age; 
(2) The dangerous condition created a substantial and unreasonable risk of 
death or serious bodily harm to children under 12 years of age using the 
property or adjacent property with due care in a manner in which it was 
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used; 
(3) The person injured, because of his immaturity, did not discover the 
condition or did not appreciate its dangerous character; and 
(4) The public entity or the public employee had actual knowledge of the 
condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character a 
sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against 
the condition. 1 
The comparison to the Restatement of Torts rule for trespassing 
children is clear. 165 However, due to the fact that the property affected 
by the Tort Claims Act is public, entrant classifications such as 
trespasser (and the accompanying trespassing child exception) would not 
apply. A separate section would be required to provide a higher duty of 
care toward children, and that is exactly what the legislature enacted. In 
discussing section 831.8(d), the legislature noted the comparison to the 
161. CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 831 (West 1980). 
162. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 831.2 (West 1980). 
163. CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 831.4 (West 1980). 
164. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 831.8(d) (West 1980). 
165. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, for requirements of the attractive nuisance 
doctrine. 
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attractive nuisance doctrine, stating that "[p ]rivate landowners are subject 
to liability under the same circumstances without regard to age of the 
injured child under the so-called 'attractive nuisance' doctrine."166 It 
is apparent that the legislature felt the doctrine would provide sufficient 
protection for trespassing children in dangerous circumstances, even if 
the use was recreational. 
In a comparison of section 846 and the Tort Claims Act, the California 
Supreme Court noted these differences when they decided that section 
846 applied only to private property. 167 The court com.pared the 
history of both statutes and noted that they were enacted two days apart, 
were considered concurrently by the same committees, and contained 
similar language and purpose.168 Additionally, subsequent amendments 
to both sections were passed as a single bill, and both sections have 
similar revisions regarding recreational use.169 The court in Delta 
Farms com.pared the two statutes in order to support a holding that 
section 846 applied only to private lands because the Tort Claims Act 
was directed solely toward publicly owned lands.170 The comparison 
was made to show that the legislature was aware of the differences in 
the provisions of each statute and would not have intended the require-
ments of one to overlap and even contradict the other.171 However, 
this argument also supports the presumption that the legislature· had in 
166. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 831.8 cmt. (West 1980). 
167. Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 
709, 660 P.2d 1168, 1175, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501 (1983). Two 15-year-old girls 
drowned in the defendant's canal. The relatives.of the victims claimed that the canal 
was a dangerous condition in that it dropped unexpectedly to a depth of 60 feet five feet 
from shore. They also claimed that the defendant was negligent in knowing of the 
condition, knowing that visitors frequented the area, and failing to provide proper 
protection. The defendant claimed immunity under both§§ 831.8 and 846. Id. at 702-
04, 660 P.2d at 1169-70, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 495-96. The court declined to find immunity 
under either section. Id. at 704, 710, 660 P.2d at 1170, 1175, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 496, 501. 
168. Id. at 705, 660 P.2d at 1111-72, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98. 
169. Nelsen v. City of Gridley, 113 Cal. App. 3d 87, 94, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 
(1980). 
170. Delta Farms, 33 Cal. 3d at 710,660 P.2d at 1175, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 501. 
171. Id. The immunity provided by §§ 831.2 and 831.4 are similar to the 
recreational use statute in providing immunity for the natural condition of unimproved 
public property and unpaved roads and trails that provide access to certain recreational 
activities. However, § 831.4 provides a more limited immunity if the road leading to 
the recreational area is paved or is an unpaved city street. Section 831.8 immunizes 
public entities from the dangerous conditions of reservoirs when used for purposes for 
which they were not intended. However, § 831.8 also includes certain exceptions. The 
immunity is negated if the user is injured by a trap known to the owner, if the entrant 
is not guilty of criminal trespass. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 831.8(c) (West 1980). Immunity 
is also not applicable when the plaintiff is less than 12 years old, and requirements 
similar to the attractive nuisance doctrine are met. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 831.8( d) 
(West 1980). 
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mind the desire to protect young children who cannot be expected to 
watch out for themselves (as shown by the inclusion of an exception for 
trespassing children in the Tort Claims Act) and was equally aware that 
additional language in the recreational use statute was not required. 
The requirements for protection of young children (as well as all 
entrants) was further expanded with the California Supreme Court's 
decision in Rowland v. Christian. 172 The removal of the traditional 
entrant classifications defining duties of care also necessarily removed 
the exceptions to those duties of care. The recreational use statute, 
however, remained an exception to the general duty of care required, still
reducing the level of care toward a recreational entrant to what was 
previously the level of care required toward a trespasser. The anomaly 
created is that by removing an exception to limited duties of care 
(trespassing children) because there were no longer such limited duties 
of care, a potential exception to the recreational use statute's limited 
duty of care was also removed. This may not have been as important 
in 1968 when Rowland was decided, due to the limited applicability of 
the recreational use statute, but with the California Supreme Court's 
recent holding in Ornelas and the expanded application of the recreation-
al use statute, this omission becomes critical. 
The Ornelas decision grants immunity to private landowners whenever 
an entrant has entered the property for any recreational purpose. Despite 
the decision's opening words focusing on the state's scenic treasures of 
shoreline, mountains, lakes, and deserts that contribute to the desire of 
the public to recreate and the demand for areas in which to do so, and 
despite the recognized intent of the legislature to encourage property 
owners to keep their land open to the public to help meet that demand, 
the court has extended immunity to any recreational purpose and to any 
private land. The court's determination that the user determines, by his 
mere use, what land is suitable for recreation and therefore relieves the 
owner of liability for injury from that use, may in fact be in line with 
other recent trends showing a desire to relieve landowners of a duty of 
care toward trespassers. 173 The court's rationale could be justified 
172. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 
(1968); see also supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. 
173. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Mall, 6 Cal. 4th 666, 863 P.2d 
207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137 (1993); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 
695 P.2d 653,211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985); Nola M. v. University of S. Cal., 16 Cal. App. 
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when the .user is able to make a determination of the risks involved in 
the use of a particular property, as is the case with adults. However, it 
ignores a long line of cases supporting the policy that children, who are 
unable to make realistic decisions, deserve special consideration.174 
The injured plaintiff in the Ornelas decision was· eight years old. The 
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant based on the 
recreational use statute, and the court of appeal reversed, but the state 
supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision.175 The supreme 
court appears to have decided, as a matter of law, that an eight-year-old 
child is responsible for the determination as to whether a place that 
appears to the child to be a good place to play (including a place 
housing old, stored, farm machinery) is actually suitable for play. 
Authorities acknowledge the purpose behind the implementation of the 
attractive nuisance doctrine as a desire to provide additional protection 
to children who were unable to protect themselves. 176 As far back as 
1891, the California Supreme Court recognized that children were less 
able to provide for their own protection.177 In considering section 339 
of the Restatement of Torts, the court stated that 
children of tender years are guided in their actions by childish instincts, and are 
lacking in that discretion which is ordinarily sufficient to enable those of more 
mature years to appreciate and avoid danger, and in proportion to this lack of 
judgment on their part, the care which must be observed towards them by others 
is increased. 178 
Even in determining an ordinary duty of care, aside from any exceptions 
to the limited duty rules, it has been widely recognized that the duty of 
care is higher in a situation involving potential danger to children, due 
4th 421, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 ( 1993 ); see also supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text; 
Irwin E. Sandler, Premises Liability in California; The Courts are Increasingly 
Protective of the Rights of Landowners, Los ANGELES LA w., Jan. 1993, at 38 
(discussing current trends in a variety of premises situations); David M. Ring, Premises 
Immunity? Courts Erect Daunting Barriers to Negligence Suits by Victims of Crime, 
Los ANGELES DAILY J., Jan. 10, 1994, at 6 (discussing the state of business premises 
liability after the Ann M and Nola M decisions). 
174. See supra discussion accompanying notes 149-60. 
175. Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 
(1993) (en bane). . 
176. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 59, at 399; Prosser, supra note 1, at 429. 
177. See Barrett v. Southern Pac.• Co., 91 Cal. 296, 27 P. 666 (1891). 
178. Id. at 302-03, 27 P. at 667; see also Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 
627, 288 P.2d 90, 93 (1955) ("Children of tender years have no foresight and scarcely 
any apprehensiveness of danger .... "); Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 
599,611,207 P.2d 864, 871 (1949) ("[T]he plaintiff was obviously a child and ... the 
quantum of care to be exercised toward children, from whom is to be expected the 
natural heedlessness of youth, is always greater than that required to be exercised toward 
adult persons."). 
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to their inability to understand risk. 179 Even after Rowland v. Chris-
tian raised the duty of care required toward all entrants, the courts 
recognized that a landowner owed a duty of care even higher than the 
Rowland standard when dealing with dangers to children. 180 
It would appear that after the California Supreme Court decided 
Rowland v. Christian the policy of protecting the state's children was 
advanced to a new level: the specific limitations on liability under the 
attractive nuisance doctrine were removed, while it continued to be 
recognized that children, who are unable to take care for themselves in 
all situations, deserve an extra duty of care from individuals responsible 
for the situation. However, the Ornelas decision has effectively reduced 
the duty of care required toward children on private land to a level 
below that which was required by the attractive nuisance doctrine. The 
Ornelas decision purports to apply only when an individual, who is not 
expressly invited, enters private land for recreational purposes. The 
179. See 57 A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 205 (1989); 1 COMMITTEE ON STANDARD 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 66 (Charles A. 
Loring ed., 7th ed. 1986). In California, the jury instruction for the standard of care 
required toward children is as follows: 
Ordinarily it is necessary to exercise greater caution for the protection and 
safety of a young child than for an adult person who possesses normal physical 
and mental faculties. One dealing with children must anticipate the ordinary 
behavior of children. The fact that they usually do not exercise the same 
degree of prudence for their own safety as adults, that they often are 
thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a duty to exercise a proportional vigilance 
and caution on those dealing with children, and from whose conduct injury to 
a child might result. 
Id. The fourth edition of approved jury instructions included an instruction regarding 
the attractive nuisance doctrine, but the instruction was deleted after Rowland v. 
Christian imposed an ordinary duty of care in all circumstances. However, a general 
instruction regarding the higher duty of care required toward children remained. See 2 
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 664-65 (William J. Palmer ed., 4th ed. 1956). 
See also Edward Meany, Standard o/Care Involving Children, 72 MICH. B.J. 574 (1993) 
(reviewing the standard of care applied in courts toward children). 
180. E.g., McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 269 Cal. Rptr. 
196, 199 (1990). In McDaniel, a two-year-old child slipped through a gap in the fence 
at the housing project where she lived. She then slipped into a creek that bordered the 
fence and suffered brain damage and quadriplegia. Id. at 4, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 197. The 
project owners were found negligent in failing to maintain the fence when it was 
foreseeable that injuries to children could occur due to gaps in the fence. Id. at 10, 269 
Cal. Rptr. at 201. In discussing the landowner's duty of care toward children; the court 
stated: "A landowner similarly shares that duty to 'protect the young and heedless from 
themselves and guard them against perils that reasonably could have been foreseen."' 
Id. at 7, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (quoting Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 629, 
288 P.2d 90, 93-94 (1955)). 
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court's broad interpretation ofrecreation appears, however, to encompass 
any activity that might be considered play by a child. The situations in 
which a landowner would owe an ordinary duty of care to a child 
entering private property to play are limited to: 
(a) willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, 
use, structure or activity; or (b) for injury suffered in any case where permission 
to enter for the above purpose was granted for consideration ... ; or (c) to any 
persons who are expressly invited rather than merely permitted to come upon 
the premises by the landowner. 181 
It currently appears that if a child suggests to a friend that they go and 
play in the friend's back yard, the parents of the friend would be 
immune from liability for any injury to the child due to the condition of 
the back yard. A duty of care would not be owed to this child 
regardless of how foreseeable it was that the children would play there, 
and regardless of how dangerous it might be in the back yard, because 
the child was not "expressly invited." Even in cases where a child is 
expressly invited, the child should not be expected to know that the 
property can be assumed to be safe only in those specific instances when 
the child is expressly invited. For example, if a child is expressly 
invited to play in a neighbor's back yard on a swing set, the neighbor 
owes a duty of due care to assure that the premises are safe. One could 
imagine, however, a situation in which the swing set breaks, but the 
neighbor leaves it in a hazardous condition while he goes away on 
vacation. The child, unaware of the condition of the swing set, enters 
the neighbor's property during that time and is severely injured when the 
swing set collapses on top of him or her. Was the child expressly 
invited onto the property that particular time? If so, the landowner 
would have been under a duty to keep the premises safe. If not, the 
landowner would have no duty. It seems a bit much to expect a young 
child to be able to know the difference. 
The extension of the statute beyond the suitability requirement to any 
private property means that any time a child wanders onto private 
property to play, the owner of that property is absolved of any negli-
gence regarding the condition and safety of his land. This seems to 
create a special class of individuals to whom no duty of care is required 
in the maintenance of one's property-the trespassing child. Although 
adults may enter another's property for a variety of reasons, including 
travel shortcuts, curiosity, recreation, and even illegal activities, the 
landowner would be immunized from liability for the condition of the 
property only for recreation. Adults who use another's property for 
181. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 846 (West 1982). 
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recreational purposes usually have planned intentions and may be 
expected to be aware of and accountable for any risks they may 
encounter. In contrast, it would be very easy to extend the landowner's 
immunity to many situations involving child trespassers other than 
preplanned recreational uses, knowing the propensity of children to stop 
and play. A child's business is play and is likely to occur during any 
other activity. The courts have recognized that children have a 
propensity to intermeddle and that a trespassing child's "activities 
usually are recreational."182 
The court's decision in Ornelas may reflect a general dissatisfaction 
with the duty of care required by a landowner toward a trespasser that 
was established after Rowland. As noted by Prosser and Keeton, the 
movement toward abolition of entrant classifications lost momentum in 
the 1970s and in 1979 "came to a screeching halt."183 They noted as 
a possible explanation that it "appears that the courts are gaining a 
renewed appreciation for the considerations behind the traditional duty 
limitations toward trespassing adults."184 Similar trends also appear in 
a number of recent California decisions involving duty of care. 
Although Becker v. /RM Corp. 185 established strict liability for the 
landlords of defective premises, the courts of appeal declined to extend 
this holding in Muro v. Superior Court186 and Hahn v. Superior 
Court, 187 both determining •that such strict liability did not apply to 
182. Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 864, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 
869 (1982); see also Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 628, 288 P.2d 90, 93 
(1955) ("childish propensities to intermeddle"); Crane v. Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 288,297, 144 
P. 356, 361 (1944) ("Known characteristics of children, including their childish 
propensities to intermeddle, must be taken into consideration .... "). 
183. KEETON, supra note 22, § 62, at 433. 
184. Id. at 434. 
185. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985). In Becker v. IRM 
Corp., the plaintiff asserted causes of action for both negligence and strict liability when 
he slipped and fell against a glass shower door in an apartment he had leased from the 
defendant. Id. at 457,698 P.2d at 117,213 Cal. Rptr. at 214. The court compared the 
activity of the landlord to that of a lessor of products (to whom strict liability would 
apply), holding that the landlord was strictly liable for injuries resulting from a latent 
defect that existed when the apartment was initially leased to the tenant. Id. at 465, 698 
P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. 
186. 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1986) (where employee of 
commercial tenant injured on premises, Becker rationale involving landlord-tenant 
relationship would not apply). 
187. 1 Cal. App. 4th 1448, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 502 (1992). In Hahn, the plaintiff was 
injured by a tree that fell while he ate lunch in an outdoor courtyard of a commercial 
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commercial premises. In addition, in Ann M v. Paci.fie Plaza Shopping 
Mall, 188 the court overturned a prior ruling which held that foreseeabil-
ity in determining negligence could be determined without showing prior 
incidents. 189 Now, a finding of negligence by a landowner in failing 
to provide proper security precautions can only be shown by a high 
degree of foreseeability, which can rarely be proven in absence of prior 
similar incidents on the landowner's premises.190 It seems clear that 
the trend of the California Supreme Court is to limit a landowner's 
liability. 191 Placing the burden of responsibility for any injury on the 
user must, however, be accompanied by the user's ability to accept 
responsibility for that injury. This ability is lacking in children who 
have yet to develop knowledge and experience of risks that may 
accompany their desire to play. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Ideally, a clarification of the intent of the legislature in the current 
application of the recreational use statute is needed. The amendments 
to the statute over the years have allowed the courts to go beyond the 
original intent to encourage landowners to keep their private property 
open for recreational use by the public. In looking at the current 
application of the statute it appears that the policy has shifted to a desire 
to immunize landowners in all instances where their property is used for 
shopping center. Id. at 1450, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502-03. The court refused to extend the 
rationale of Becker, which gave protection to a residential tenant, to commercial 
premises liability. Id. at 1452, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504. 
188. 6 Cal. 4th 666, 863 P.2d 207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137 (1993). An employee of 
a tenant of a shopping center owner brought a suit for negligence against the owner 
when she was raped on the premises. Id. at 670, 863 P.2d at 209, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
139. The court held that a requirement of providing security guards could not be 
imposed without a high degree of foreseeability that would rarely be found without prior 
similar incidents occurring on the premises. Id. at 679, 863 P.2d at 216, 25 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 145. 
189. See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 
Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985). When a doctor was assaulted in a hospital parking lot, the court 
allowed the plaintiff to establish foreseeability without evidence of prior similar 
incidents. Factors such as location of the hospital, other criminal activity in the area, 
inadequate lighting, and absence of security could all be used to demonstrate that the 
attack was foreseeable and that the defendant was negligent in not providing adequate 
protection. Id. at 130, 695 P.2d at 661-62, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65. The test 
announced for foreseeability was the totality of circumstances, allowing the case to go 
to the jury even without prior similar incidents. Id. at 126-27, 695 P.2d at 659, 211 Cal. 
Rptr. at 362. 
190. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Mall, 6 Cal. 4th 666, 863 P.2d 207, 25 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 137 (1993). 
191. For a review of the recent trends in premises immunity cases, see Ring, supra 
note 173; Sandler, supra note 173. 
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recreation. The legislature should look carefully at the ramifications of 
this policy as it applies to the possible negligent maintenance of 
dangerous situations. It appears that construction site owners are no 
longer required to keep their sites safe from children who enter to play 
and that private property owners may keep hazardous conditions on their 
property, as long as it is only playing children who are exposed to the 
danger. 
Statutory exceptions for children are already part of the Tort Claims 
Act. The legislature specifically included an exception for immunity 
under section 831.8 of that Act. This part of the Tort Claims Act 
applies to reservoirs, which are the only public property addressed in the 
Act likely to contain dangers to children that could reasonably be 
controlled and limited by human intervention. The statute does not limit 
governmental liability in this case if the person injured is under twelve 
years of age. The other sections, which deal with unimproved public 
property and unpaved public roads, are far less likely to contain 
dangerous conditions that are as easily controlled or limited. The 
legislature obviously felt it important to protect young children when it 
was possible to do so. 
Similar protections could be adopted for children trespassing on 
private land where dangerous conditions exist. A specific statutory 
exception was not necessary when· the recreational use statute was 
adopted. Both the limited activities included under the statute and the 
existence of protection for trespassing children under the attractive 
nuisance doctrine provided adequate protection for children. However, 
this is no longer the case. Due to the way the law has developed, a 
specific exception for young children is necessary, just as it was 
necessary in the Tort Claims Act. The legislature should add a section 
to the recreational use statute along the lines of section 831.8(d) of the 
Tort Claims Act. This would replace the protection originally provided 
by the attractive nuisance doctrine and bring the duty of care owed to 
children in line with that of the Tort Claims Act. Children who are 
unable to reasonably make the determination that a property is suitable 
for play need to be protected by those who are in control of the property 
and reasonably able to provide safety, when that owner is aware that 
children may be there. 
Alternatively, the courts could incorporate a higher duty of care 
requirement into their interpretations of the recreational use statute when 
children are involved. Even though the statute takes away the duty of 
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care required of landowners toward recreational users and makes no 
explicit exception for children, the broad application of the rule that a 
higher duty of care is required toward children could provide an 
exception to the no-duty requirement toward adult trespassers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has traced the application of two distinct policies in 
California. The policy to provide increased space for recreation to 
combat the ever-increasing pressure on public land led to the legislative 
enactment of California's recreational use statute. The separate policy 
to provide protection to children too young to assume responsibility for 
their actions led the courts to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine. Due 
to the limited application of the recreational use statute, the two were 
able to coexist over a period of time. However, the broadening of the 
application of the recreational use statute, as it currently applies any time 
a child trespasses on private property to play, puts the policy of 
encouraging open spaces in direct conflict with the policy of protecting 
children. In fact, it appears that a new category of individuals toward 
whom almost no duty is owed has been created in the trespassing child. 
The supreme court does not appear to have taken into consideration the 
desire of society to protect young children in its Ornelas decision; 
however, the precedent has now been established so that landowners 
may no longer be encouraged to maintain safe conditions in areas where 
children may be expected to play. A step by the legislature to clarify its 
intent in the application of the recreational use statute or the addition of 
an exception in favor of young children should be taken to support the 
duty of society to care for its children. 
KATHRYN D. HORNING 
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